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law requires that the water-users shall repay the entire cost of the works in ten years, while in Algeria the French government meets at least four-fifths of the cost of the works, and in Tunis gives the syndicates twenty-five years in which to repay the cost of works built by the government. It is the opinion of many in this country that farmers cannot pay the cost of government works in ten years, and the French are evidently of the same opinion. It is very likely that this provision of our law will have to be amended before government works will be financially successful.

RAY P. TEELE.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Human Nature and the Social Order. By CHARLES HORTON COOLEY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902. Pp. viii + 404.

PROFESSOR COOLEY'S conception of social relations is based upon a different theory of personality from that hitherto prevailing in social philosophy. The current sociological doctrine, he thinks, is a veiled materialism, seeing that it regards society as an association of human organisms, rather than as an association of persons. As these organisms are plainly separate, the only way of cementing them into a social aggregate is to assume some special trait—sociability, altruism, or the like. Professor Cooley, on the other hand, insists that social order is a matter of conduct, conduct is a matter of motive, and motive springs from "personal ideas," *i. e.*, ideas of persons. The problem of social order can be nothing else than a psychical problem, *how to harmonize selves*, whereas it has been conceived as a physiological problem, *how to harmonize organisms*. "My association with you consists in the relation between my idea of you and the rest of my mind." "The immediate social reality is the personal idea." Society itself "is a relation among personal ideas." Persons "are not separable and mutually exclusive, like physical bodies," but interpenetrate one another. "Self and other do not exist as mutually exclusive social facts," and hence do not need to be held together by a cement of altruism. "We do not think 'I' except with reference to a complementary thought of other persons." The false antithesis of "society and individual," "egoism and *alter*," arises from conceiving personal ideas as having the separateness of material bodies.

Personal opposition is not the collision of two organisms, but the incompatibility of two self-ideas. The tap-root of evil is feebleness of

imagination, which prisons one in the suggestions of his organism and leaves his ideas of others dim and weak. Conscience is not a distinct faculty. We apply it to those judgments which ensue upon "a somewhat protracted mental struggle involving an imaginative weighing of conflicting personal ideas." The right is not the altruistic, but that which is felt to be rational. The wrong is not private, but the partial, the irrational. "To violate conscience is to act under the the control of an incomplete and fragmentary state of mind." The sense of right is the peculiar feeling that accompanies mental unification. It is our need of vivid ideas of absent persons that makes "all goodness and justice, all right of any large sort, depend upon an active imagination."

Taking this strictly psychical view of human relations, Professor Cooley proceeds to discuss in a delightful way such special cases as communion, conformity and nonconformity, rivalry, hero-worship, leadership, confession, personal degeneracy, freedom, etc. Throughout he avoids the jargon of the schools and utters his thought in pure and graceful English sown with polished phrases and pointed epigrams. The skeleton of psychological analysis is overlaid with a wealth of illustrative material drawn from literature and autobiography. The book, moreover, has the ozone of independent and unacademic thinking, and will not age rapidly.

The author's psychology is built along the line followed by James, Royce, and Baldwin, and is probably proof against serious criticism. One may, however, think twice before accepting his implications as to the true character of sociology.

That the selves of associates can so develop and englobe one another as to bring about a social equilibrium can hardly be doubted in the face of the author's demonstration. But one may question if the moral self he describes is typical. Is this intellectualized being actuated only by secondary emotions flowing from his ideas of himself and of other selves normal? Where are primary emotions, like *Hunger und Liebe*? Is this thought-system in which personal ideas fall into an orderly whole the bed rock of personality? Is it not rather a thin crust, liable to be shattered by the volcanic uprush of burning desires from the physical organism?

As one follows this "Pilgrim's Progress" of personality, to the Celestial City, one cannot but exclaim: "Where, then, is the struggle for existence?" The self, far from being the *aura* of an exigent organism with canine teeth, is "any cherished idea," "any line of thought with

which one tends to be unduly preoccupied." Selfishness arises, not from the clamor of wants, but from "inadequacy of imagination." Hostility there is, but it does not arise out of interferences, but out of incompatibilities. Rivalry is recognized, but it is a mere sporting competition and has nothing to do with practical aims. Resentment flames out, not against those who thwart us, but against those who entertain "an injurious thought regarding something which we cherish as a part of our self." Surely this ethereal psychology goes with three meals a day and a bank account. The mirroring of the selves of all in the mind of each may keep in order sated, comfortable people, but hardly persons with unsatisfied wants yapping at their heels. One wonders if the study of moral psychology in the confessions of Montaigne, Rousseau, Emerson, Goethe, and other geniuses, may not mislead one as to the forces that hold commonplace persons in orderly relations.

While, then, this deeply pondered book will doubtless bring many sociologists under the conviction of sin, it is not certain they will be willing to go along with the author in his extremely subjective interpretation of the social reality. Sociology occupied with groups of creatures marked in soul and body by ancient conditions of survival—these groups being in definite relations to other groups, and to a physical environment—must be an objective science. It would scarcely meet the expectations formed of it if it admitted that "mind . . . is the *locus* of society."

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Essai d'une philosophie de la solidarité. By LÉON BOURGEOIS.
Paris: Alcan, 1902.

IT is increasingly doubtful if Marx's *Klassen-Kampf* is the sole means to the amelioration of the lot of the masses. Certain it is that a significant change is coming over the leaders of the working class in France and Germany. As they win support among the intellectuals, as they find themselves making substantial headway, they appeal less to class hatred and more to the sentiment of justice. They would vanquish their opponents in the sphere of moral ideas as well as in the political arena.

A sign of this new temper is the series of lectures and discussions on social solidarity given in the *École des hautes études sociales* and presided over by Léon Bourgeois, formerly prime minister of France. The aim of M. Bourgeois is to recast the canons of justice in the light of sociological thought. The moral philosophers, owing to a defective